The term Ubiquitous Computing was coined by Mark Weiser almost two decades ago. Despite all the time that has passed since Weiser's vision, ubiquitous computing still has a long way ahead to become a pervasive reality. One of the reasons for this may be the lack of widely accepted formal models capable of capturing and analyzing the complexity of the new paradigm. We propose a simple Petri Net based model to study some of its main characteristics. We model both devices and software components as a special kind of coloured Petri Nets, located in locations, that can move to other locations and synchronize with other co-located nets, offering and requesting services. We obtain an amenable model for ubiquitous computing, due to its graphical representation. We present our proposal in a progressive way, first presenting a basic model where coordination is formalized by the synchronized firing of pairs of compatible transitions that offer and request a specific service, and ad hoc networks are modeled by constraining mobility by the dynamic acquisition of locality names. Next, we introduce a mechanism for the treatment of robust security properties, namely the generation of fresh private names, to be used for authentication properties.
Introduction
The term Ubiquitous Computing was coined by Mark Weiser [20] to describe environments full of devices that compute and communicate with its sur- This is a preliminary version. The final version will be published in Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science URL: www.elsevier.nl/locate/entcs rounding context and, furthermore, interact with it in a highly distributed but pervasive way [19] . Since Weiser's vision, a great deal has been achieved, mainly because of advances in microelectronics, that make possible the design of smaller embedded devices. However, the state of the art is probably not as advanced as expected. One of the reasons may be the fact that we still lack widely accepted formal models, needed at various levels of abstraction, to understand the probably largest engineered artifact in human history [15] .
Ubiquitous systems present extra difficulties when dealing with coordination issues. In the first place, inherent to ubiquitous computing is the continuous change of state of the different components that form a system. This fact, together with the unreliable nature of ad hoc nets and the autonomy of components make the orchestration approach unrealistic and little robust.
In his short paper [15] R. Milner gives a list of topics that must be taken into account when describing and analyzing ubiquitous systems, namely distributed and mobile computing, security and privacy, boundaries and trust, game semantics, hybrid and stochastic systems and model checking. Most of these topics have been extensively studied during the last decade, and we have formal approaches to treat them in isolation. In the case of Petri nets, we also have proposals covering most of them (for instance, stochastic nets have been extensively studied for performance analysis), although there are a few for which we still lack the adequate concepts (as security).
Petri nets models are interesting for their amenable graphical representation, their solid theoretical basis and mainly for the importance of the Petri Nets-community. The fact that ordinary P/T-nets are not Turing-complete makes them rather manageable, in the sense that it gives us many decidability results for powerful infinite-state systems, which do not hold in other Turing-complete models, such as process algebra with recursion operators.
In this paper we propose a Petri Net based model to study some of the problems that arise in the framework of ubiquitous computing. It is true that there already exist some models based on Petri nets (see Section 6) that deal with some basic aspects of ubiquitous computing, such as mobility. Instead, we will mainly focus on other important features that were not specifically considered in those previous models, such as the coordination between the supply and demand of resources by processes, context awareness, and ad hoc nets.
We model both devices and software components as special kinds of coloured Petri Nets, that are located in a specific domain. However, this location can change when a special movement transition is fired. We abstract from middleware details, like those dealing with service discovery or transport protocols. Thus, transitions offering or requesting a service are detected by others just by its mere existence. These transitions can only be fired when the local synchronization is allowed, that is, when the request and the offer are co-located. The synchronous nature of these interactions can be understood as an ab-straction of the underlying asynchronous-public message exchange protocols used for choreography, since we want to focus on the interactions caused by those messages. In particular, (local) communication is achieved as a special case of synchronization, by means of token transfer from one net to another.
The security model will be based on three pillars: in our first basic model, both knowledge of locality names (thay may dynamically be acquired) for access control regarding mobility and knowledge of service names for coordination are used, while in the extended model that we present in Section 5, name certificates for authenticity will be added. In fact, we can rely only on the knowledge of locality and identifier names, thus separating the security and the coordination issues.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the main definitions of our model and some examples. Section 3 we compare the expressive power of MSPN's with that of ordinary Petri nets. In Section 4 we present a variant of the classical algorithm to directly compute (in a more efficient way) the coverability tree of a MSPN system. Authentication issues are considered in Section 5 by introducing a new class of tokens that represent certificates, to distinguish between processes. Finally in the two last sections we discuss related work and present our conclusions and a sketch of our current and future work in the subject.
Mobile Synchronizing Petri Nets
A Mobile Synchronizing Petri Net (from now on, MSPN) is a special kind of coloured Petri Net, with only two different colour types: one for localities and a singleton colour type for ordinary black tokens. MSPN's may have three types of transitions: autonomous transitions, synchronizing transitions and movement transitions. Autonomous transitions are just ordinary transitions in P/T nets [6] . Instead, the firing of a synchronizing transition needs the presence of a conjugate transition in the same location. We will say that one of them is offering the service while the other one is requesting it. When both transitions are co-located and separately fireable according to the ordinary firing rule, they can be simultaneously fired. Finally, movement transitions are as autonomous ones, except that they change the location of the net firing that transition. Thus, black tokens can only be used for control, but locality-tokens are also used by nets to set their destination when performing a movement transition.
In the following, we will use A for the set of autonomous transition labels, with the special label go ∈ A, L for locality names, Tokens = L ∪ {•}, S for services, S! = {s! | s ∈ S} and S? = {s? | s ∈ S} for offers and requests of those services respectively, · : S! ∪ S? → S! ∪ S? a conjugation function defined as s? = s! and s! = s?, and Var (with ε ∈ Var ) for a set of variables. For a partial function F we will write x ∈ F instead of x ∈ Dom(F ). Next we define MSPN's: Definition 2.1 A MSPN is a labelled coloured Petri Net N = (P, T, F, λ, C) where P and T are the sets of places and transitions of the net, respectively, F : (P × T ) ∪ (T × P ) → Var is a partial function from the set of arcs to variables, λ : T → A ∪ S! ∪ S? is a function labelling transitions and finally C : P → {•, L} is a function colouring places, such that:
(i) For every p and t such that (t, p) ∈ F (resp. (p, t) ∈ F ),
(ii) For every t ∈ T and p ∈ P such that λ(t) ∈ A, C(p) = L and (t, p) ∈ F there exists p such that C(p ) = L and F (t, p) = F (p , t).
(iii) For every t ∈ T with λ(t) = go, there exists exactly one p with C(p) = L such that (p, t) ∈ F .
For homogeneity we are assuming in the definition that every arc is labelled with a variable. However, we only need variables to distinguish between the occurrence of different locality tokens. That is why we introduce the special variable ε, that labels every arc that is adjacent to an ordinary black-token place, as stated in condition (i). Condition (ii) says that every variable appearing in an outgoing arc of an autonomous transition must also appear in some incoming arc of that transition, so that locality tokens can only be consumed or moved by those transitions, but not made up. Condition (iii) establishes the existence of a single distinguished locality-place for each movement transition, used, as we will see later on, to specify the destination of movements. Let us introduce some notations to compress those definitions. We will denote as
• t and t • the sets {p | (p, t) ∈ F } of preconditions and {p | (t, p) ∈ F } of postconditions of transition t, as usually. Moreover, we will write pl (p, t) = pl (t, p) = p, tr (p, t) = tr (t, p) = t, P x = {p | C(p) = x} for x ∈ {•, L},
• t L } and Var (t) = I(t) ∪ O(t). Then those conditions can be restated as
(ii) For every t ∈ T such that λ(t) ∈ A, I(t) ⊆ O(t).
A marking of a MSPN system is not only a tuple of markings, one for each net; the location of its nets is also part of the state and, therefore, we will need a function that determines their current location.
where M = (M 1 , . . . , M n ) is such that each M i is a marking of the MSPN N i and loc : N → L is a function that maps each MSPN to a location.
We will write
denote F i (a) if a ∈ F i and λ(t) to denote λ i (t) when t ∈ T i . With these notations we can take markings of MSPN systems as pairs (M, loc) with M : P → MS f (Tokens).
Transitions can be fired in different modes, as happens for any kind of highlevel Petri net. A mode specifies which tokens are taken from the preconditions of the transition. Formally, for us they are just functions from the set of variables of a transition to the set of tokens. For homogeneity, we have also labelled arcs that are adjacent to black-token places with the special variable ε. Therefore, that variable, and only it, must be assigned to the black-colour token.
Definition 2.4 We will call mode of a transition t ∈ T to any mapping σ :
Now we define the firing of the different kinds of transitions. In the following definitions we will assume that σ(F (a)) = ∅ when a / ∈ F .
Definition 2.5 [Autonomous transition] Let N be a MSPN system, t ∈ T i with λ(t) ∈ A and M = (M, loc) a marking of N, using the previous notations. Transition t is enabled with mode σ if for all p ∈ • t, σ(F (p, t)) ∈ M (p). The reached state of N after the firing of t with mode σ is the marking M = (M , loc ) given by:
(ii) If λ(t) = go then loc = loc. Otherwise, loc (N j ) = loc(N j ) for every j = i and loc
Given a pair of transitions t 1 ∈ T 1 and t 2 ∈ T 2 , we write
Using these notations we will define when two synchronizing transitions are compatible. The compatibility conditions are merely syntactical: On the one hand, their labels must be conjugate, i.e., one must offer the service and the other must request it; On the other hand, the pair of transitions must meet together the same condition as autonomous transitions, that is, every variable appearing in outgoing arcs must appear in some incoming arc of any of the transitions. Definition 2.6 Given a pair of transitions t 1 and t 2 , we will say they are compatible if:
The definition of mode of a pair of synchronizing transition is analogous to Definition 2.4: Definition 2.7 Let (t 1 , t 2 ) be a pair of compatible transitions. We will call mode of it to any mapping σ :
Now we can define when a pair of synchronizing transitions is enabled in a certain mode and which is the reached marking: Definition 2.8 [Synchronizing transition] Let N be a MSPN system, t i and t j two compatible transitions and M = (M, loc) a marking of N. We say that the pair of transitions (t i , t j ) is enabled with mode σ if for all p ∈
• t h , σ(F (t h , p)) ∈ M (p) for h ∈ {i, j} . The reached state of N after the firing of (t i , t j ) with mode σ is the marking M = (M , loc) where for every p ∈ P ,
Both in the case of autonomous and synchronizing transitions we will write N(M)[u(σ) N(M ) (omitting N when there is no confusion) to denote that marking M results in M after the firing of transition u = t or of the pair u = (t 1 , t 2 ), in mode σ. We will say that a marking M is reachable from an initial marking M 0 if there exists a chain
We will call u 1 (σ 1 ). . . . .u n (σ n ) a trace of N and denote T r(N) the set of traces of N.
Legal markings are preserved by transition firings:
Proposition 2.9 If M 0 is a legal marking and M is reachable from M 0 then M is a legal marking.
A special case of MSPN systems are those in which the nets are partitioned in two disjoint sets P roc := {N 1 , . . . , N k } and Ag := {N k+1 , . . . , N n } in such a way that L = P roc and λ i (t) = go for every t ∈ T i for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Nets in P roc can be interpreted as controller processors (immobile) where (possibly) moving nets in Ag, or agents, may migrate. This was the approach taken in [10] .
Example
In this section we present a simple example showing the applicability of the concepts introduced above. The first process shown below, located in a location we call H, is a forwarder that sends any other process asking for it to a location where it can receive a designated service, present at every location k ∈ K. More specifically, it outputs one of the locations in K, when synchronizing with the special transition ASK .
Every time this forwarder gives away one of those locations it moves to that location (in a more elaborated system it could send an emissary there) and informs that a new process demanding the service may come, by means of a synchronizing transition labelled with NEXT . Processes offering service SERV , each located in a different k ∈ K, can take the forms in the following figure: The one on the right is a (limited) variation of the one in the left, in which the service is only offered a determined number of times (three times in this case).
Then, and only then, the service will actually be offered. We can now ask for the properties that this system has when in presence of possible clients. For instance, a client like the following would interact with the system in the desired and expected way:
However, the following client tries to use its permission more than once. After it synchronizes with SERV it may move somewhere else, do "something" and return to the previous location. Of course, it can only synchronize again successfully with the service when the set K contains more than one instance of that permission (it contains that token more than once) and the forwarder is reusing a different instance of the same permission to allow some other process to receive the service. Furthermore, the following process does not attempt to use its permission, but goes to a location in L and "sells" it away. It can keep on doing so until it decides to escape, firing transition ESC , going somewhere else and restarting the selling there.
Obviously, the system is vulnerable to any of the attacks we have shown. All of them represent undue use by legitimate parties, where by legitimate we mean that they know in advance location H. We can interpret it as a situation in which a concession to use some service is offered to some community/group of users (by making public to them location H). Improper use of the service there offered is a shared responsibility of the members of that community. The previous examples are instances of members of that group making improper use of the service.
Thus, we can only state that every action SERV corresponds to a different occurrence of ASK , but, as we have seen, not that the synchronizing parties of the two synchronizations are the same. In fact, this is impossible to guarantee in our model, since no mechanism to distinguish between different processes exists. We will discuss a way to guarantee that in Section 5.
MSPN's vs. ordinary Petri nets
In this section we show how ordinary P/T Petri nets can faithfully simulate the behavior of MSPN's. Trivially, P/T nets are a special case of our nets and therefore, both models have indeed the same expressive power. We will first show how to reduce the static version of MSPN's in [10] to ordinary P/T nets and then reduce MSPN's to their static version.
From static MSPN's to ordinary P/T Nets
In this first step we have to simulate two features of static MSPN's: localities (and movement between them) and synchronization of transitions, since in [10] there were not locality-tokens. With the purpose of simulating the former we will have new places (i, k), meaning that the net N i is located at k when that place is marked. Movement transitions must change that marking accordingly, in such a way that if (i, k) is marked (and therefore all the (i, l) are not, for l = k) then the firing of a transition t go (k, l) moves the token from (i, k) to (i, l). The synchronization of transitions t ∈ T i and t ∈ T j will be simulated by combining them into a single transition for each locality, (t, t , k), adding as preconditions the places (i, k) and (j, k) (meaning that they can only synchronize when both nets N i and N j are co-located at k).
. . , N n } be a static MSPN system with N i = (P i , T i , F i , λ i ) and initial marking (M, loc), and let us denote P = P i , T = T i , F = F i and λ = λ i . If K is the set of all elements in L appearing in N and in (M, loc) (which is finite) we define the ordinary Petri net N * = (P * , T * , F * ), where:
(iii) F * is the least set satisfying:
In order to prove the correctness of our simulation we define the following relation between markings of the static MSPN system and correct markings of the P/T net, which follows immediately from the intuitive ideas we used to define the simulation. we define the following marking for N * , (M, loc) * : P * → N:
Theorem 3.3 Given a static MSPN system N and a marking (M, loc) of N, for the associated ordinary Petri Net N * and its marking (M, loc) * , we have
• λ(u) ∈ A ⇔ u = v.
• u = (t 1 , t 2 ), t 1 ∈ T i and loc
Example 3.4 Consider the simple MSPN system, composed of a single net (with no synchronizing transitions) located at l, on the left of the following figure. The corresponding translation to ordinary P/T nets is the net on the right.
From MSPN's to static MSPN's
To simulate MSPN's with static MSPN's, all we have to add to the model are colours and, therefore, modes of transitions. For that purpose, for each p in the original system we will consider one different p k for each locality k, so that having a black token in p k stands for having a k at p. Moreover, we will have a different transition t(σ) for each mode of transition σ, that will take p k as precondition/postcondition only if the variable in the corresponding arc is mapped to k by σ. We will suppose that no net synchronizes with itself, since this situation can trivially be reduced to an autonomous transition.
be a MSPN system with N i = (P i , T i , F i , λ i , C i ) and initial marking (M, loc). If K is the set of all elements in L appearing in (M, loc) (which is always finite by construction) we define the static MSPN system
As in the previous section, markings of the original net and of its simulation are related in the following way: Definition 3.6 Given a MSPN system N and a marking (M, loc) of N, we define (M * , loc) as the following marking for N * :
Theorem 3.7 Given a MSPN system N and a marking (M, loc) of N, for the associated system N * and its marking (M * , loc), we have
Moreover:
• u = (t 1 , t 2 ) ⇔ v = ((t 1 , t 2 ), (t 2 , t 1 )).
• λ(u) = go, σ(
Notice that we are overloading the notation so that in the previous theorem, on the left hand-side of the equivalence u(σ) means "the firing of u with mode σ", while on the right hand-side it means "the firing of v(σ)".
Coverability analysis
In the previous section we have shown how MIPN systems can be simulated with ordinary P/T nets. Therefore, any of the characteristics of the model that are preserved by the transformation have the same degree of hardness that the corresponding characteristic in P/T nets. In particular, since we know that coverability is decidable in P/T nets, so it is in our model. However, the previous transformations would produce an exponential explosion on the size of the resulting net. In order to perform the analysis directly on the original model we can take an approach based on traditional ω-markings [6] . We will denote by k ω the multi-set with infinitely-many (countable) copies of k, that is i<ω {k} and we will allow them to be part of our markings: Definition 4.1 We will call ω-marking of a MSPN (P, T, F, λ, C) to any function M : P → MS (Tokens). We will say a ω-marking M is legal if M (P x ) ∈ MS (x) for x ∈ {L, •}. Analogously we define ω-markings of a MSPN system. Notice that we have suppressed the subscript f , so that now we allow infinite markings. However, this infiniteness will only appear as a consequence of the presence of infinitely-many copies of some tokens. Therefore, now it can be the case that for some z ∈ Tokens, z ω ⊆ M (p) for some p ∈ P . MSPN system {N 1 , . . . , N n }. We will say that M M if M (p) ⊆ M (p) for every p ∈ P and loc(N i ) = loc (N i ) for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For z ∈ Tokens and q ∈ P we will write M ≺ q z M if M M and M (q)(z) < M (q)(z). We will use this order relation to cut the reachability tree generated by an initial marking. When starting from M, if we reach a state M with M M that means that we can follow the same path that has lead us from M to M once again. If M ≺ (N 1 , . . . , N n ) be a MSPN system with initial marking (M 0 , loc 0 ). We say that a sequence of transitions t 1 (σ 1 ), t 2 (σ 2 ), t 3 (σ 3 ), . . . is an ω-sequence if there exist pairwise distinct ω-markings (M 0 , loc 0 ), (M 1 , loc 1 ), (M 2 , loc 2 ), . . . such that for each index i: (i) Transition t i is enabled at marking (M i−1 , loc i−1 ) with mode σ i .
(ii) Let M = (M , loc ) be the marking produced by the firing of transition t i with mode σ i . Then: (a) loc i = loc (b) If there exists j < i such that M j M , then for every p and z: if
The previous is the usual definition of ω-sequence of transitions, adapted to our setting. As said before, transitions are fired following the ordinary rules, but when a strict growth of markings is detected with respect to any kind of tokens, we annotate this marking as having a potentially arbitrary large number of those tokens. The relation between markings and ω-markings is the following:
Theorem 4.5 If (M, loc) is a reachable marking then there exists a reachable ω-marking (M ω , loc) such that M (p)(z) = M ω (p)(z), for every p and z with M ω (p)(z) = ω.
Since in any state there is a finite amount of enabled transitions with some mode, the procedure terminates when every reached marking has appeared somewhere before in its ω-sequence. This eventually happens, as stated in the following Theorem 4.6 Every ω-sequence of transitions is finite.
Example 4.7 If we denote by (M 1 , M 2 , M 3 , M 4 ) the marking M of the simple MSPN below, in which the two nets are always co-located in some location, meaning that M (p i ) = M i , then the following is an ω-sequence (omitting the location function). The firing of the second transition would have produced the marking ({k, l}, ∅, {k}, ∅), but this marking is strictly greater than the initial marking with respect to p 3 and k.
({k, l}, ∅, ∅, ∅) 
On authentication
The mechanism presented in the previous section does not allow us to address some security issues such as authentication. For instance, in the previous model it is impossible to control the number of times that processes obtain a service or the order in which they receive different services. Therefore, a more robust model is needed for authentication issues.
As a first approach, we propose a local identification mechanism that is sufficient in some applications and not as "expensive" (regarding communications) as a classic global authentication infrastructure, that cannot always be afforded, specially in the ubiquitous setting.
We can just take N as our domain of identifications. However, we do not want that names produced by a process can be forged by others. To avoid that possibility we will consider disjoint domains for each process, that is, Id = i∈I N. Thus, identifiers will take the form (i, m) with i ∈ I and m ∈ N. Then, to formalize that names cannot be forged, we will suppose that each index i ∈ I belongs to a single process and that each process only has constructors of pairs (i, m) for the indices i ∈ I it owns. These constructors are just special transitions, labelled with succ, that take a token (i, m) from a distinguished precondition place and yield as many tokens (i, m + 1) as postconditions of that colour. For simplicity in the following we will suppose that there is a copy of the naturals for each net, that is, I = {1, . . . , |N|} so that identifiers of the form (i, m) will belong to N i .
We will use the following notation, A for autonomous transitions, with go, succ ∈ A, Var L a set of locality variables, Var Id a set of identity variables with Var Aut ⊆ Var Id and two special variables τ + , τ − ∈ Var Id \Var Aut and Var • = {ε}, and we take Tokens = L∪Id ∪{•} and Var = Var L ∪Var Id ∪Var • . Using the previous notation and that introduced in Section 2 we have the following definitions.
Definition 5.1 A MSAPN is a labelled Petri Net N = (P, T, F, λ, C) where P is the set of places, T is the set of transitions, F : (P × T ) ∪ (T × P ) → Var is a partial function from the set of arcs to variables, C : P → {L, Id , •} is a function colouring places extended to arcs by C((t, p)) = C((p, t)) = C(p), and λ : T → A ∪ S! ∪ S? is a function labelling transitions, such that:
(
ii) For every t ∈ T such that λ(t) ∈ A, I(t) ⊆ O(t).
(iii) For every t ∈ T with λ(t) = go, |
• t L | = 1.
(iv) |{t | λ(t) = succ}| ≤ 1 (v) If λ(t) = succ then there exists a single place c such that:
Id and τ + and τ − only appear in those arcs.
where
Each net has at most one successor transition, in which case it has a single identifier precondition place that we will call counter of the net (denoted in the previous definition by c), that is also a postcondition of that transition, and that it is neither a precondition nor a postcondition of any other. These restrictions avoid the possibility to use this mechanism to simulate ordinary counters, that is, natural variables. In particular, every time the succ transition is fired it produces a new value. The following is an example of a valid use of a succ transition. 
The use of those new special variables τ + and τ − is redundant, since they correspond to the single precondition arc and to all the postconditions arcs leading to identifier places. Thus, they can be not shown when drawing a system.
Systems of MSAPN's are defined similarly to the ones in the previous section: In order to properly define the behaviour of the new special transition succ we have to make sure that two conditions are satisfied: on the one hand, modes of succ transitions can only consume (i, m) tokens that belong to that net; on the other hand, the value taken by τ + must be the successor of the value taken by τ − .
Definition 5.4 Using the previous notations, given an autonomous transition t ∈ T i , a mode of t is any mapping σ : Var (t) → Tokens such that
When defining modes of pair of transitions we can ignore the new variables, since they never appear in synchronizations. Thus, the definitions of mode for a pair of synchronizing transitions is similar to that in the previous section. However, compatibility of synchronizing transitions needs to be adapted: Definition 5.5 Given a pair of transitions t 1 and t 2 , we will say they are compatible if:
Usefulness of the variables in Var Aut comes just from the last condition above. Whenever such a variable appears as precondition in a synchronizing transition it must also appear as a precondition in its compatible transitions. In this way we force the matching of two identifiers, each in one of the nets, as we will see in the example in the next subsection, thus checking that the user in one side has the permission of the server in the other to use the corresponding service.
Definition 5.6 Let (t, t ) be a pair of compatible transitions. We will call mode of it to any mapping σ :
Using these notations the firing rules of autonomous and synchronizing transitions are exactly as in the previous section, and the analogous of Proposition 2.9 also holds.
Example
The following is an extension of the example seen in Section 2.1, with the authentication features introduced. Now the forwarder gives away, when asked, not only the location where the process can receive the service, but also a unique identifier, so that the only process capable of receiving the service that is offered after this request is that showing the same identifier. 
•
Of course, the clients should be accordingly modified. We can see that now the two attacks seen in Section 2.1 can be avoided. Indeed, since identifiers cannot be forged, each one of them corresponds to an offer of the service. Therefore, there is no point in attempting to use the service more than once. It is true that a client could still give away its permission to access the service, but in such case it could loose the possibility to use the service itself, since each permission can be used at most once. Thus, the system would be safe if we assume that we do not mind who actually accesses the service: in any case we know it would be either that who received the permission or any delegate.
However, the following attack could still occur:
This process follows the protocol but then fails to synchronize with the service, thus producing a DoS attack. Another such attack could consist in first receiving the service and then trying to receive it again, causing also a deadlock in the offering process. This can be solved by adding to that process an autonomous transition abort that re-boots the system at that time.
In fact, we have simplified the example for illustration purposes. In the first place, in general we cannot assume that the forwarder and the server are the only processes that know of the synchronizing primitive N EXT , so that they should also use the authentication primitives to guarantee that they are synchronizing with each other. Moreover, the server is willing to offer SERV after asking some process for its identity and checking that it is one of the identities in its data base, but nothing guarantees that, at the end, the process that receives the service is the same that showed its identity. That is why authentication variables were introduced. If we suppose that the variable match is in Var Aut then, by definition of compatible transitions, any client synchronizing with SERV ! must also have that variable in some incoming arc. By means of this mechanism we can guarantee that the client receiving the service is indeed the one that was allowed to do so.
Related Work
Some new versions of several formal models can be applied in fields related to ubiquitous computing like workflow, flexible manufacturing or agent-oriented approaches (mobile agents and/or intelligent agents as in AI research). Among these, we are specially interested in those based on Petri nets. For instance, the interest of Elementary Object Systems [18] has been illustrated by means of several interesting case studies. Elementary Object Systems are composed of a system net and one or more object nets that move along the former, like ordinary tokens of it. Such tokens are able to change their marking, but not their structure, either lying on a place or when being moved by a transition of the system net. In this way, the change of the object net marking can be either independent from the system net or triggered by it.
In contrast with Elementary Object Systems and their reference semantics, which allows to access a net token from many places at the same time, in Nested Petri nets [14] each token is located at a single place at each time. Net tokens may be produced, copied and removed during a system run, as expressed by labels on arcs. The number of those tokens, as well as the level of nestedness, is unlimited, thus obtaining multi-level nested systems, whose behaviour consists of three kinds of steps: An autonomous step in a given level of a Nested Petri net follows the ordinary firing rule for high-level Petri nets; horizontal synchronization is defined as the simultaneous firing of two element nets located in the same place of a system net; and vertical synchronization is the firing of a system net together with the firing of its token nets that are involved.
In earlier papers [9, 8] , we have introduced another multi-level extension of the Elementary Object Systems called Ambient Petri nets, which allows the arbitrary nesting of ambients permitted in the Ambient Calculus [4] . As a consequence, it is possible to find in the places of an Ambient Petri net both ordinary and high-level tokens. The latter move along the net due to the firing of ambient transitions, labeled by capabilities that are obtained from names. In [8] the basic model of Ambient Petri nets has been extended with the aim of supporting the replication operator from the Ambient Calculus, !P , which generates an unbounded number of parallel replicas of P . By combining these elements, together with concepts such as limitation of access to locations, Ambient Petri nets provide a framework to describe wide area network mobility.
In [1] Asperti and Busi define Mobile Petri Nets, largely inspired by the join-calculus. They introduce mobile connectivity in their nets, in a π-calculus fashion. More specifically, tokens' colours are tuples of place names (in this sense they are high-level), so that tokens at the preconditions of some transitions can specify their destination place. In this way, every place is a potential postcondition for them, what makes Mobile Petri Nets difficult to draw. Our way of achieving authentication, by means of successor transitions in pairwise disjoint domains, is equivalent to the generation of fresh local names. In [7] the authors give a Petri net semantics to the π-calculus, thus having to deal with local names, although only in the finite case. They focus on treating local names in a compositional way, though their solution using a single tagplace, where a kind of global environment is represented in a rather ad hoc way.
Another translation of π-calculus to Petri nets is [11] , where they use Petri nets extended with inhibitor arcs. However, compositionality is achieved in such a way that they get nets with infinitely many places and transitions. This infiniteness was also the problem of most of the first Petri nets semantics of process algebras, such as [17] . To avoid this undesirable feature E. Best, R. Devillers, M. Koutny et al. developed the Petri Box Calculus (PBC) [2] , where the classical parallel operator is separated into an interleaving operator and a unary synchronization operator, what makes possible to avoid the infinite blow of the semantics nets. In fact, we have already developed several extensions of this model to incorporate into it new features, such as ambients in APBC [9] .
Conclusions and Future Work
We have extended the model of two-level ubiquitous systems introduced in [10] , in which a collection of processors that remain fixed in their locations provide services to a collection of processes that move from one processor to another with the purpose of obtaining the resources they need. In the current version of the model, we no longer distinguish between processes and processors, since no substantial difference exists between them. Thus, an ubiquitous systems is simply a collection of component nets that can offer and/or request services.
The supply and demand of services/resources is modeled by the synchronous firing of two different transitions located in the involved component nets, namely a service-demand transition and a service-supply transition. Besides, mobility is formalized by the execution of movement transitions, by means of which the process changes its current location. The new destination is set by the label of the token consumed by the go transition, since component nets are defined as a particular class of coloured Petri nets [13] , in which places are occupied by either ordinary tokens or locality tokens that are labelled with locality names. Such tokens are consumed and produced according to the labels of the arcs of the net, which when needed are variables from a countable set of variable names.
These simple component nets do not allow to address some security issues such as authentication, but the model can be easily extended in order to include a local identification mechanism. Then tokens are coloured with pairs of the form (i, n), with n ∈ N. Besides, net arcs are labelled in such a way that they guarantee that locality names cannot be forged.
As stated in Section 3, the defined systems (without identifiers) can be simulated by ordinary Petri nets, which makes possible the analysis of properties by means of existing tools. However, the ordinary nets obtained as result of this translation are quite complex both in structure and size; as a consequence, Mobile Synchronizing Petri Nets simplify the model of ubiquitous systems, focusing in mobility aspects and security issues [4] . When we introduce identifiers, the translations we have seen do no longer work, since we cannot rely anymore on the finiteness of the number of classes of tokens that appear in a system. However, we claim that bounded MSAPN systems can also be coded with P/T nets, even in the case where an infinite number of different tokens can be (at different times, as implied by boundedness) at some places. In a forthcoming paper [16] we study the expressiveness of our model when we do not assume boundedness. We have proved that their expressive power lies somewhere between P/T nets and Turing machines by means of several decidability and undecidability results.
We think that our model, in spite of its simplicity, is a flexible framework for the specification of mobile systems, specially in the setting of Ubiquitous Computing. In the first place, there is an explicit separation between the different actors that participate in the system. Second, localities play a major role by encapsulating the range of synchronization of transitions, as in calculus for distributed and mobile systems, such as Dπ [12] or the ambient calculus [3] . Moreover, we separate coordination issues (by means of synchronizing transition names, that can be seen as coordination primitives, thus abstracting from the underlying layer of communication) from security issues (knowledge of localities and/or names).
As work in progress, we are currently defining new features that improve the applicability of our model, mainly a type mechanism to dynamically obtain the set of services/resources that are requested/provided in each locality of the system. We try to (statically) capture by means of types the desirable properties of processes, even in the presence of an arbitrary hostile environment.
Other extensions of mobile synchronizing nets are interesting. For instance, we are enhancing our model to deal with trust issues. This leads us to treat more complex security properties that we are studying by means of more sophisticated type systems. As a matter of fact, we are quite surprised by the apparent lack of any serious study of typed Petri nets, where by typed we mean not just any syntactic information, as in our definitions or in any classic model of many-sorted coloured nets, but instead some semantic information, as that used for example in [5] , to capture security properties of processes.
Another enhancement will be the addition of a non flat topology of the net of localities, to treat in a more faithful way the problems that arise in mobile ad hoc networks.
